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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent years have witnessed a rise in conflict between WTO Members over the use of state subsidies 
designed to promote the renewable energy sector. Government subsidies are seen by domestic 
policymakers as a key catalyst in attracting foreign investment, building capacity and meeting other 
domestic policy goals. However, subsidies and other state incentivization programmes often carry trade-
distorting effects. The article examines the current state of WTO law and jurisprudence on subsidies 
extended to achieve environmental goals, in particular the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff 
case and the more recent India—Solar Cells case which higlights the localization problem in the 
renewable energy sector. The case outcome shows that the WTO continues to maintain the status quo by 
prioritizing free trade over environmental considerations. The article also discusses the possibility of 
reform in the GATT/WTO framework for promotion of renewable energy initiatives while maintaining 
the integrity of the system. 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE 
 
In late August 2015, the dispute settlement panel established by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) confidentially circulated its decision in the much-anticipated case of 
India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (the Panel Report was 
eventually circulated to the public in February 2016).1 At the original version of the article’s 
time of writing, various media resources had begun to report on the outcome of the case and 
the contents of the confidential interim report.2 As per the initial reports, India officially 
appealed the finding of this case in April 2016. 3  In the India—Solar Cells case, the 
complainant (viz. the US) argued that domestic content requirement maintained by India to 
promote use of solar energy conflicted with its WTO obligations. While the parties will now 
battle in the Appellate Body where some findings of the panel’s decision may be reversed or 
                                                 
* LLB (Hons), LLM, PhD. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University. Member, Transnational, 
International, Comparative Law and Policy [TICLP] Network. I am grateful to Tonya Roberts who provided 
invaluable and prompt research assistance. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 WTO Panel Report, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 24 February 2016, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R [India—Solar Cells]. 
2 See e.g. D Ravi KANTH, Asit Ranjan MISHRA, and Utpal BHASKAR, “WTO Rules Against India in Solar 
Panels Dispute with the US” LiveMint (27 August 2015), online: LiveMint 
<http://www.livemint.com/Politics/11yE8Bz6bgZZ6LhXXlB8eL/WTO-panel-rules-against-India-in-solar-
dispute.html>; Charles PIERSON, “How the US and the WTO Crushed India’s Subsidies for Solar Energy” 
Counterpunch (28 August 2015), online: Counterpunch <http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/08/28/how-the-us-
and-the-wto-crushed-indias-subsidies-for-solar-energy/>; Rajesh ROY, “WTO Panel Rules Against India’s Solar 
Program” The Wall Street Journal (1 September 2015), online: The Wall Street Journal 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/wto-panel-rules-against-indias-solar-program-1441112645>.  
3 See generally, WTO, “Notification of an Appeal by India under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and Under Rule 20(1) of 
the Working Procedures for Appellate Review”, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules, 20 April 2016, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/9; “India Loses Solar Case Against US at WTO; to Appeal” 
NDTV (28 August 2015), online: NDTV <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-loses-solar-case-against-us-at-
wto-to-appeal-1211764>; and Michael CRUICKSHANK, “India Loses WTO Case on Solar Panels Suppliers” 
The Manufacturer (1 September 2015), online: The Manufacturer 
<http://www.themanufacturer.com/articles/india-loses-wto-case-on-solar-panels-suppliers/>.  
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modified, the decision clearly highlights larger systemic issues within the WTO, especially 
with regard to the ability of the WTO Members to pursue domestic development policies 
using subsidies. 
 
 The Indian programme in question, known as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission 
programme (JNNSM), was initiated by the Government of India in early 2010. Briefly, the 
JNNSM aims to generate an additional 20,000 megawatts of electricity by 2022. 4  The 
JNNSM aims to achieve its objective through several phases. Under the JNNSM, entities that 
develop solar power generation projects (referred to as the Solar Power Developers, 
abbreviated as SPDs) enter into power purchase agreements (PPAs) with power purchasers 
(PPs) that are under the control of the Indian Government. The PPs agree to purchase 
electricity generated by the SPDs solar technology at a fixed, contractually agreed rate. The 
generated electricity is then sold onwards to distribution utility companies that in turn sell 
electricity to consumers.  
 
The JNNSM is managed by the Government of India’s Ministry of New and Renewable 
Energy (MNRE). The MNRE oversees two government-owned entities, namely, the National 
Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI).5 
NTPC-owned subsidiary NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Limited (NNVN) managed Phase I of 
the JNNSM, including entering into PPAs with SPDs.6 During Phase II of the JNNSM, the 
role was transferred to SECI (which is wholly-owned by the Indian Government and is under 
the administrative control of the MNRE).7  
 
The dispute between India and the US rests on the domestic content requirements (DCRs) 
that were included in the Guidelines accompanying various Batches within Phase I and II of 
the JNNSM. The draft Guidelines stipulated that participating SPDs must use solar cells and 
modules manufactured in India.8 The US claim highlighted that in order for an SPD to avail 
fixed, contractually-agreed rates under the JNNSM, the SPD must ensure compliance with the 
DCR requirement for solar cells and modules used in Solar Photovoltaic (PV) power plants.9 
The US claim also highlighted the progressive increase in the DCR requirements over time to 
include not just solar cells and crystalline silicon solar modules, but also solar thin-film 
modules.10 This expansion in the scope of DCRs was of concern to the US, because US 
exports of thin-film technology held significant share in the Indian solar PV market as 
opposed to solar cells and solar modules (where the US exports to India were few).11 
 
                                                 
4 See generally, Government of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, “Scheme / Documents”, online: 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy <http://www.mnre.gov.in/solar-mission/jnnsm/introduction-2/>.  
5 See NTPC, “NTPC Overview”, online: NTPC <http://www.ntpc.co.in/en/about-us/ntpc-overview>; and Solar 
Energy Corporation of India, “Introduction” , online: SECI 
<http://www.seci.gov.in/content/innerpage/introduction.php>.  
6 WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.4-5; and EU, “Third Party Written Submission by the European 
Union”, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 19 December 2014, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS456, at paras. 7-8.  
7 Ibid.  
8 See USTR, “First Written Submission of the United States”, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells 
and Solar Modules, WTO Doc WT/DS456 (24 October 2014) at paras. 26-8.  
9 The US, for example, cited section 2.5D of the Draft Guidelines for Phase II (Batch 2) of the JNNSM entitled 
as “Domestic Content Requirement”. The relevant provision reads: “Under the DC, the solar cells and modules 
used in the solar PV power plants must both be made in India” (Ibid., at paras. 26-8, 32). In the earlier Phase I 
(Batch 1) Guidelines, the US highlighted section 2.5D which explicitly stated that “in case of Solar PV Projects 
to be selected in the first batch during FY 2010-11, it will be mandatory for Projects based on crystalline silicon 
technology to use the modules manufactured in India” (Ibid., at para. 30). 
10 See USTR, supra note 8 at para. 33. 
11 See e.g. the discussion in Pierson, supra note 2. 
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The dispute settlement process was initiated in February 2013 by the US when it requested 
consultations with India on measures relating to domestic content requirements maintained 
under the JNNSM. 12 The US claimed that these measures violated several provisions of 
GATT and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). More specifically, the US 
claimed that India’s measures not only violated the GATT/WTO norms, but also caused 
impairment or nullification of benefits accruing to the US through the WTO Agreements.  
 
During the course of the proceedings, several countries reserved their third party rights 
under Article 10 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). These third party 
countries included the EU, Canada, and Japan, who are not only major stakeholders in the 
international renewable energy market, but whose trade interests also stand to be affected by 
the outcome of the India—Solar Cells case.13 Japan, for example, submitted that as one of the 
largest producers of solar thin-film technology impacted under the Indian DCRs, it was 
indirectly affected by the DCR requirement under the JNNSM and therefore, had a 
“substantial interest”.14 Japan also pointed out its role as the complainant in the Canada—
Feed in Tariff case, the leading WTO “precedent” in the area of renewable energy subsidies to 
date.15 The other third party countries may also be affected indirectly if they have policies 
akin to the Indian JNNSM programme that require the use of domestic content. Therefore, the 
decision by the dispute settlement panel and the impending decision by the Appellate Body 
can potentially have significant repercussions on how WTO Member governments construct 
their subsidy programmes in relation to renewable energy schemes. 16  Following the 
consultation phase, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a dispute settlement 
panel in September 2014. The dispute settlement panel issued its interim report to the 
disputing parties in late August 2015. Originally kept confidential, the report was made public 
in February 2016. Accordingly, the original draft of this article which was written circa 
August 2015 took into consideration documents available in the public domain. With the 
public release of the Panel Report in India—Solar Cells, the references to documents 
outlining the disputants’ arguments have been updated and supplemented with the relevant 
paragraphs from the Panel Report. 
 
Part I of this article briefly introduces the issues underpinning the question of state support 
for the development of domestic sectors, and then examines the pertinent arguments in the 
Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariffs case (which shares similar issues and questions 
of law with the India—Solar Cells case). Part II examines the arguments of the parties in the 
India—Solar Cells case, providing a basis for analysis in Part III of the article. Part IV 
suggests an alternative approach (entitled “Reverse Permissibility”) that may help to resolve 
the question of state support towards development of domestic renewable energy industries.  
 
                                                 
12 See generally, Government of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, supra note 4.  
13 WTO records Brazil, Ecuador, Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, EU, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Norway, Russia 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey as countries which have reserved their third party rights. See WTO, “dispute settlement 
- the disputes - DS456”, online: WTO <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm>.  
14 WTO, “Request to Join Consultations—Communication from Japan”, India—Certain Measures Relating to 
Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 25 February 2014, WTO Doc WT/DS456/4.  
15 Ibid.  
16 See e.g. comments in Ishita DAS, “Switching off the Sun? The India—US Solar Cells Dispute” Oval Observer 
Foundation (19 January 2015), online: Oval Observer Foundation <http://ovalobserver.org/switching-off-sun-
india-us-solar-cells-dispute/>.  
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I. THE QUESTION OF STATE SUPPORT: THE CANADA—RENEWABLE 
ENERGY/FEED IN TARIFFS CASE  
 
State-supported development of domestic industries is not a new concept. All developed 
countries have adopted such measures in the past. However, in the context of the renewable 
energy sector and its associated industries, state support assumes greater complexity. This is 
for two reasons. 
 
First, renewable energy producers cannot compete with conventional energy producers due 
to steep differences in operating costs and business characteristics.17 As long as differences 
exist between conventional and renewable energy generation, the market for renewable 
energy can only come into existence through government regulation. 18  In other words, 
governments’ policy decisions to diversify the energy generation base create room for an 
otherwise non-competitive source of power generation. 
 
The second complication flows from the point in time when the government makes a 
policy decision to diversify the energy generation base to include power generation through 
renewable energy. At this point in time, governments often connect the renewable energy 
sector with domestic allied industries in a bid to create jobs and attract foreign investment into 
the country. In order to do so, governments offer various incentives and support programmes 
to local industries and foreign investors. The cornerstone of these support policies is usually 
an incentivization programme which encourages use of locally-produced components in order 
for the renewable energy generator to qualify for further benefits, such as competitive power-
purchase tariffs. This is where such policies may fall afoul of GATT/WTO rules on subsidies. 
The most recent, and perhaps the best, illustration is the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariffs case, which underscores the limitations imposed by international trade rules on the 
development of a renewable energy sector by the WTO Members.19  
 
The Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariffs case assumes greater importance in the 
present case because it is considered a direct “precedent” in WTO jurisprudence on renewable 
energy policies. This is illustrated through India’s attempts to differentiate Ontario’s Feed-In 
Tariff (FIT) Program from the JNNSM, and the arguments of the US which point out 
similarities between the two.20 The following section examines pertinent arguments made by 
the Appellate Body in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariffs case.  
 
Similar to India, Ontario’s FIT Program incentivized electricity producers to use a 
minimum percentage of domestically-manufactured components in exchange for a fixed, 
guaranteed rate of power purchase for long-term periods spanning 20-40 years. The FIT 
Program was challenged by the EU and Japan; both lodged separate disputes but cited similar 
arguments. The common arguments in both claims were that it violated GATT Article III: 4 
                                                 
17 See e.g. WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, 
6 May 2013, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R [Canada—Renewable Energy]; and Canada—Measures Relating to 
the Feed-in Tariff Program, 6 May 2013, WTO Doc. WT/DS426/AB/R [Canada—Feed in Tariff] at paras. 5.170, 
5.174 cited in Rajib PAL, “Has the Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed-in Tariff 
Program Opened the Door for Production Subsidies?” (2014) 17 J Int Economic Law 125 at 128.  
18 WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at para. 5.175. 
19 See e.g. Leah STOKES, “The Politics of Renewable Energy Policies: The Case of Feed-in Tariffs in Ontario, 
Canada” (2013) 56 Energy Policy 490 at 495. 
20 See e.g. USTR, “Second Written Submission of the United States”, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar 
Cells and Solar Modules, 11 March 2015, WTO Doc. WT/DS456 at paras. 18-23, 28-32. 
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(National Treatment) and Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement.21 Furthermore, by providing 
the benefit of guaranteed tariffs, the Government of Ontario essentially extended prohibited 
subsidies that effectively constituted import substitution, thus violating Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 
of the WTO ASCM.22 Both the EU and Japan made the prohibited subsidy argument the 
cornerstone of their complaint since a finding under Article 4.7 of the ASCM would have 
meant that the dispute settlement panel will recommend immediate withdrawal of the 
offending measure by the violating Member.23 
 
The Appellate Body, in its decision, upheld the earlier findings by the panel that the feed in 
tariffs scheme was in violation of GATT Article III: 4 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMS 
Agreement.24 Earlier, the panel in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariffs grappled with 
the question whether various feed in-tariff schemes operated by Ontario were inconsistent 
with Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement by virtue of “being inconsistent with the national 
treatment obligation provided for in Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994.”25 The panel in its 
analysis acknowledged reliance placed by Canada upon Article III: 8(a) of the GATT 1994, 
which would have served “to remove the challenged measures from the scope of Article III: 4 
of the GATT 1994, and thereby also the disciplines found in Article 2.1 of the TRIMs 
Agreement.”26 Article III: 8(a) provides a “way out” for governments of the WTO Members 
in extending National Treatment to other WTO Members. The effect of Article III: 8(a) is that 
National Treatment obligations would not be applicable to any laws, regulations, or 
requirements pertaining to government procurement of products purchased for governmental 
purposes and not for any commercial resale. 27  Additionally, Article 2.2 of the TRIMS 
Agreement informs WTO Members about the existence of the Illustrative List contained 
within the Annex of the TRIMS Agreement. Article 2.2 aids in interpreting Article 2.1 
prohibition and the GATT National Treatment obligation contained within Article III: 4. 
 
Essentially what Article 2.2 is stating is that any TRIMs described in the Illustrative List of 
the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement is considered inconsistent with WTO Members’ 
obligations under Article III: 4. Within the Illustrative List, Paragraph 1(a) provides that: 
 
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of 
Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or 
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and 
which require: 
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic 
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of 
products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; (emphasis 
added)   
   
Therefore, on a combined reading of the aforementioned provisions, the task before the 
panel was to determine, firstly, whether Canada could rely upon Article III: 8(a) of the GATT 
to escape the application of Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement; and if not, whether the 
measures challenged by the EU and Japan were the ones covered under Paragraph 1(a) of the 
Illustrative List. The panel’s finding was that Canada failed to establish its reliance on Article 
III: 8(a) of the GATT because the procurement of electricity under various feed-in tariff 
                                                 
21 See WTO Panel Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, 19 December 
2012, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/R [Canada—Renewable Energy]; and Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in 
Tariff Program, 19 December 2012, WTO Doc. WT/DS426/R [Canada—Feed in Tariff] at paras. 3.1, 3.4. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., at paras. 3.2(a), 3.5(a). 
24 WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at para. 5.85. 
25 WTO Panel Report, supra note 21 at para. 7.107. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., at para. 7.118. 
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schemes was pursuant to commercial resale of electricity.28 The panel also concluded that the 
measures challenged by the EU and Japan fell within the coverage of Paragraph 1(a) of the 
Illustrative List and hence, Canada was in violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement 
and Article III: 4 of the GATT.29 
 
Upon appeal, the Appellate Body moved beyond the panel decision on derogation from 
Article III: 8(a). The panel had earlier concluded that Ontario’s purchase of electricity was 
well within the ambit of Article III: 8(a) because the solar and wind power generation 
equipment was needed to produce electricity.30 That would have meant that Ontario’s DCR 
requirement and consequent purchase of electricity generated would have amounted to 
government procurement, thereby bypassing the application of GATT Article III: 4 and 
TRIMS Article 2:1. According to the panel, there was sufficient evidence to establish a “close 
relationship” between products (i.e. power generation equipment) affected by the DCR and 
the product procured therefrom (i.e. electricity).31  
 
The Appellate Body was not convinced. The Appellate Body decided that there was 
insufficient connection between the DCR under Ontario’s programme and the consequent 
purchase of electricity so as to bring the said DCRs within the scope of Article III: 8(a).32 The 
Appellate Body observed that the product being procured by Ontario was electricity while the 
product that was the subject of discrimination by way of its origin was power generation 
equipment.33 Hence, the Appellate Body concluded that these two products were not in a 
competitive relationship.34 The Appellate Body also clarified that, in determining the nature 
of a competitive relationship between associated products, consideration must be given to 
“inputs and processes” that are employed to produce a particular product.35 
 
In addition to Article III: 8(a) derogation, another issue at appeal before the Appellate 
Body was the claim by the EU and Japan that the feed-in tariff scheme operated by Ontario 
amounted to a prohibited subsidy under Article 1.1 of the ASCM. Here the line of reasoning 
differs from the arguments adopted in the case of a derogation claim under Article III: 8(a). 
Article 1.1 of the ASCM provides the test to determine a provision of subsidy. This test was 
explained by the Appellate Body in Canada—Aircraft 36  as requiring either a financial 
contribution or direct transfer of funds (or purchase of goods); [and that] benefit is conferred 
as a result (emphasis added). 
 
The Appellate Body further explained that coverage of subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of 
Article 1.1(a)(1) is not mutually exclusive.37 Here, the Appellate Body placed reliance on an 
earlier Appellate Body decision in US—Large Civil Aircraft, wherein it was observed at para. 
613 that Article 1.1(a)(1) did not explicitly “spell out the intended relationship between the 
constituent subparagraphs.”38 
  
                                                 
28 Ibid., at para. 7.152. 
29 Ibid., at para. 7.167. 
30 Ibid., at para. 7.127. 
31 Ibid. 
32 WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at para. 5.78. 
33 Ibid., at para. 5.79. 
34 Ibid., at para. 5.79. 
35 Ibid., at para. 5.63. 
36 See generally, WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 2 
August 1999, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R [Canada—Aircraft]. 
37 WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at para. 5.119. 
38 Ibid. 
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The Appellate Body was of the view that the EU and Japan had failed in establishing that 
the feed-in tariff scheme qualified as a prohibited subsidy within the purview of Article 1.1 of 
the ASCM. The implication of this finding is that claims under Article 3.1 and 3.2 (prohibited 
subsidy) essentially failed because a positive finding under Article 1 is a prerequisite for a 
finding of a prohibited subsidy.  
 
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel finding that the feed-in tariff scheme did 
provide financial contribution within the purview of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the ASCM.39 This 
was because the Government of Ontario had purchased electricity generated under various 
feed-in tariff schemes.40 However, the Appellate Body held that the second limb of Article 1 
of the ASCM (i.e. Article 1.1(b)) conferring a benefit was not satisfied.41 In reaching this 
decision, the Appellate Body seemed to be saying that when governments decide to diversify 
the energy mix within a country leading to the creation of a new market as a consequence, and 
this market would not otherwise have existed without governmental action/incentivization,  
this cannot be termed as conferrng a “benefit” within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the 
ASCM.42 The Appellate Body reasoned: “Where a government creates a market, it cannot be 
said that the government intervention distorts the market, as there would not be a market if the 
government had not created it.”43 
 
The Appellate Body continued to say that the creation of markets by a government does 
not amount to extending subsidies within the meaning of the ASCM.44 However, government 
interventions in markets that already exist may amount to subsidies “when they take the form 
of a financial contribution, or income or price support, and confer a benefit to specific 
enterprises or industries.”45 
 
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body’s decision effectively stops at this point because it was 
unable to complete the analysis on whether the challenged measures conferred a benefit under 
Article 1.1(b) of the ASCM and whether Canada acted contrary to Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of 
the ASCM. The Appellate Body declared that it found it “impossible to complete the legal 
analysis due to insufficient factual findings in the panel report or a lack of undisputed facts on 
the panel record.”46 The Appellate Body also cited “complexity of the issues, the absence of 
full exploration of the issues before the panel, and, consequently, considerations for parties’ 
due process rights” as further reasons behind the non-completion of the analysis on conferral 
of benefit.47  
 
II. THE CURRENT DISPUTE: INDIA—SOLAR CELLS 
 
India—Solar Cells is a clear case of government policy intervention that enables the 
renewable energy sector to advance. In addition to diversification in energy generation, 
governmental intervention obviously creates fertile grounds for investment and business 
opportunities. In the absence of any government intervention, the renewable energy sector 
                                                 
39 Ibid., at para. 5.128. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., at paras. 5.246, 6.1(b)(i). In doing so, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding, in paragraphs 
7.328(ii) and 8.7 of the EU Panel Report (see WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at para. 6.1(b)(i)).  
42 Ibid., at para. 5.175. 
43 Ibid., at para. 5.188. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., at para. 5.224. 
47 Ibid. 
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would not be able to compete with traditional power generators.48 Essentially, the dispute 
between the US and Indian Governments centers around the use of governmental measures to 
promote a sector which may invariably conflict with multilateral trade commitments under the 
GATT/WTO. 
 
The US arguments points to, and challenges, such governmental measures adopted by 
India that aim to increase the use of solar PV technology in generating electricity. The 
measures in question are the DCR requirements that were found in various stages of the 
JNNSM (see discussion above). The US argued that India’s DCRs breached GATT Article III: 
4 and TRIMS Article 2.1, because the DCRs “modify the conditions of competition in favour 
of cells and modules made in India to the detriment of imported equipment in violation of 
Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994.” 49  The US specifically states that the DCRs operate 
selectively to exclude imported solar cells and modules from certain projects under the 
JNNSM while allowing the use of domestically manufactured cells and modules in all 
projects under the JNNSM. 50 The US further claimed that the Indian measures breached 
Articles 3.1(b) as well as 3.2 of the ASCM, which provides subsidies contingent on import 
substitution. The US also invoked Articles 5(c), 6.3(a), and 6.3(c) of the ASCM, citing 
adverse effects on US trade interests through the displacement or hindrance of US exports of 
solar cells and modules to India.51  
 
A. GATT Article III:8 Derogation 
 
Predictably, India attempted to provide a defence of its measures under GATT Article III: 8 
derogation along similar lines to Canada in the earlier Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariff case. Furthermore, India defended its measures citing various general exceptions under 
GATT Article XX (d) and (j). With this background in mind, this article now summarizes 
arguments of the disputing parties (and third parties, where relevant) along with the Panel’s 
analysis. 
 
At the outset, India made an admission that the DCRs in question qualify under Paragraph 
1(a) of the Illustrative List of the TRIMS Agreement subject to the finding that they are held 
to be inconsistent with Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994.52 It seems that India’s strategy was to 
limit the case to GATT Article III: 4 by watering down the importance of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 
of the TRIMS Agreement and the Illustrative list. By limiting the analysis and the defence of 
its measures, India’s strategy appears to utilise the escape valve under GATT Article III: 8(a) 
derogation which constitutes an exception to the GATT Article III: 4.  
 
In hindsight, however, this strategy proved fatal to the Indian defence in India—Solar Cells 
case. The US fully exploited this concession by citing the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed 
in Tariff judgment, where the Appellate Body noted that any measure that falls within the 
                                                 
48 See e.g. discussion of the investment and transaction cost cycle with reference to wind energy sector in 
developing countries in Umair GHORI, “Risky Winds: Investing in Wind Energy Projects in Pakistan” (2012) 
30(2) J.Energy Nat. Resources & Envtl L. 129 at 153-6; see also the discussion in Pal, supra note 17 at 128-31; 
and Stokes, supra note 19 at 495. 
49 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.39; see also, USTR, “Second Opening Statement of the United 
States”, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 28 April 2015, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS456 at paras. 2, 4; and USTR, supra note 8 at paras. 26-33.  
50 USTR, Ibid at para. 4; see also USTR, supra note 8 at paras. 31-3. 
51 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.50-1; see also WTO, “Request for Consultations by the United 
States”, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 11 February 2013, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS456/1 at 2. 
52 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.42, 7.44; see also, India’s response to Panel Question No. 2 (b) 
referred to by USTR, supra note 20 at para. 8. 
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meaning of Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List automatically becomes inconsistent with 
Article III: 4 of the GATT (see arguments in the preceding section).53 The US had initially 
argued for Article III: 4 of the GATT to be reviewed first, but during the course of 
proceedings was found to lean towards the view that violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMS 
Agreement is contingent on finding of a violation of GATT Article III: 4. 54  The Panel 
observed that there are divergent views on the sequencing issue not only by the disputants but 
also by the third parties.55 The EU, for example, claimed that Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the 
TRIMS agreement along with the Illustrative List is the more specific provision, therefore, 
should be applied first.56 The EU was of the view that if analysis under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of 
the TRIMS agreement is conducted first, “subsequent analysis of Article III of the GATT 
1994 will naturally follow.”57 Canada and Japan disagreed with this approach suggested by 
the EU. Japan cited conduct of past panels which began their analysis from GATT Article III: 
4 while considering TRIMS and GATT 1994 claims simulataenously. 58 The Panel in its 
response referred to previous Panel Reports in EC—Bananas III, Indonesia—Autos, 
Canada—Autos and India—Autos and acknowledged the variance in past panels’ treatment of 
this issue.59 However, the Panel explained that the issue in the current dispute is not about 
sequencing. Rather, the question is whether measures falling within the purview of paragraph 
1(a) of the TRIMs Illustrative List are inconsistent with Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994.60 
The Panel was of the view that, if the measures fall within paragraph 1(a) of the TRIMS 
Illustrative List, no additional analysis of Article III: 4 of the GATT is needed.61  
 
In order to resolve this issue, the Panel referred to the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariff case, the “unambiguous wording of Article 2.2”, the TRIMs Illustrative List, and noted 
that the chapeau of Paragraph 1 of the Illustrative List repeats the same language as Article 
2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement.62 Therefore, any measure that falls within Paragraph 1(a) of the 
Illustrative List will necessarily be inconsistent with GATT Article III: 4.63 The Panel also 
refused to accept India’s argument, drawn from the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariff case, that Article 2.2 and the Illustrative List clarify to which TRIMs the general 
obligation in Article 2.1 applies.64 India claimed before the Panel that Article 2.2 and the 
Illustrative List only serve to provide examples of measures that are subject to the obligations 
within Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement.65 This view would have meant that any measure 
that fell within Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List will only be an “initial trigger” for 
obligations under Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, and that a further assessment under 
GATT Article III: 4 would be required.66 In responding to this argument, the Panel relied on 
the principle of effet utile, which provides that any party interpreting an international treaty 
would not be free to adopt a meaning that reduces parts of the treaties as redundant.67 The 
Panel queried India’s interpretation and declared that such an approach is difficult to reconcile 
                                                 
53 See USTR, supra note 20 at para. 8. 
54 See WTO, supra note 1 at foonote 219. 
55 Ibid., at para. 7.45.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., at footnotes 145, 146. 
60 Ibid., at para. 7.46.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., at para. 7.47. 
63 Ibid., at para. 7.47, citing Appellate Body’s arguments in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff case (see 
WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at paras. 5.24 & 4.103). 
64 Ibid., at para. 7.51.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., at para. 7.52. 
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given the plain language of Article 2.2 and the chapeau of Paragraph 1 of the TRIMs 
Illustrative List. 68  Accordingly, the Panel went on to hold that measures falling within 
Paragraph 1(a) of the TRIMs Illustrative List are automatically inconsistent with GATT 
Article III: 4 and thus do not require a separate analysis.69 The Panel specifically analysed the 
Indian DCRs and concluded that these measures incentivized use of locally manufactured 
goods in exchange of long term guaranteed tariff rate for SPDs that utilized them.70 Therefore, 
the Panel held that such measures were not only in violation of TRIMS Agreement, but also 
accorded less favorable treatment to imported like products under GATT Article III: 4.71 
Having concluded its analysis to the first major issue, the Panel noted that its conclusion does 
not prejudice any further analysis on GATT Article III: 8(a) derogation72 which formed an 
important part of India’s defence.  
 
As noted above, GATT Article III: 8(a) is an exception to the application of GATT Article 
III: 4. GATT Article III: 8 derogation is applicable only where the imported product (that is 
the target of discrimination) is in competitive relationship with the product being purchased 
(this was clarified in the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff case). Therefore, India 
had to convince the Panel that the conditions for derogation were met. This, in turn, meant 
determining the issue of whether the Government of India was purchasing solar modules or 
purchasing electricity.  
 
The overall Indian argument was that the derogation under GATT Article III:8(a) is 
applicable to the DCR measures in question and therefore, the DCR measures are not 
inconsistent with GATT Article III:4 or Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 73 In other 
words, the Government of India, through its policies, was actually procuring solar cells and 
modules because it is purchasing the electricity generated therefrom.74 The US opposed this 
argument by referring to the Appellate Body report in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariff case wherein it was held that there was insufficient connection between the DCRs and 
electricity generated for Article III: 8(a) requirement to be met.75 Therefore, the US argument 
was that the derogation for government procurement under Article III: 8 would not be 
applicable to the DCRs because the government was essentially procuring electricity while 
the products facing discrimination were renewable energy equipment.76  
 
B. Attempts to Distinguish the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff case 
 
India adopted a novel approach to avoid implications of similar findings in Canada—
Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff. India attempted to exploit the flexibility in the 
interpretation of Article III: 8(a) by terming the solar panel and modules as “integral input”, 
while products such as inverters and electrical wiring were termed as “ancillary.” 77 This 
would have allowed India to claim equal treatment between the procured product and the 
discriminated product and introduce a further ground for distinguishing DCRs under JNNSM 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., at para. 7.54. 
70 Ibid., at paras. 7.55–73.  
71 Ibid., at paras. 7.74–99. 
72 Ibid., at para. 7.54 (see footnote 168). 
73 Ibid., at para. 7.101. 
74 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.101, 7.108, 7.109–10 & 7.114; see also, India’s First Written 
Submission, paragraph 114 referred to by USTR, supra note 20 at para. 14; and USTR, supra note 20 at para. 16. 
75 See WTO Panel Report , supra note 1 at para. 7.154; and WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at paras. 
5.76-8. 
76 See WTO Panel Report , supra note 1 at paras. 7.142 & 7.165; and WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 
17, at paras. 5.76, 5.79. 
77 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.109, 7.124, 7.127 (see, in particular, footnote 320). 
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and Ontario’s FIT Program. 78  In its arguments, India referred to the Appellate Body’s 
observation in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff that a “competitive relationship 
between products may require consideration of inputs and processes of production used to 
produce the product.”79 In essence, India’s argument here was that discrimination against 
imported products can be covered under Article III: 8(a) derogation, provided that the product 
being discriminated is an integral input for production of the product that is eventually 
procured by the government.80  
 
The US opposed the Indian argument of terming solar panels and modules as integral 
inputs. Instead, the US claimed that solar panels and modules are capital equipment which are 
not “consumed” or “incorporated” in the power generation process.81 The US was of the view 
that the governmental agencies purchased electricity generated by the SPDs but not the solar 
cells and modules, since those remained the property of the SPD.82  
 
In addition to the above, India attempted to differentiate the DCRs under Ontario’s FIT 
Program with the DCRs under JNNSM. In particular, India argued that the focus of the first 
two phases of the JNNSM was on solar power generation using Indian origin solar cells and 
modules.83 India explained that the requirements under the JNNSM sought to “procure solar 
cells and modules that result in solar power generation.” 84 This, according to India, was 
different from the FIT Program in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff, where the 
focus rested upon domestic content in a set of designated activities of a power plant and not 
on the generation of electricity by that plant. 85  The US dismissed the Indian arguments 
attempting to distinguish the DCRs under JNNSM and the feed-in tariff under Ontario’sFIT 
Program. The US termed the DCRs under both programmes as “functionally identical” and 
that both required SPDs to “purchase or use domestically sourced renewable energy 
equipment.”86 The US argument was based on the Appellate Body’s observation in Canada—
Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff that the electricity purchased by Ontario was not in 
competition with the renewable energy equipment purchased by the SPDs.87 Therefore, any 
minor differences between JNNSM and Ontario’s FIT Program were inconsequential in the 
application of the Appellate Body’s observation in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariff to India—Solar Cells.88  
 
During the Panel proceedings, the EU (one of the complainants in Canada—Renewable 
Energy/Feed in Tariff) supported the US stance in India—Solar Cells. The EU stated that: 
 
“The crux of the matter is whether the products are in a competitive relationship, not whether they are 
somehow related. To hold otherwise would in effect, allow discrimination by proxy: Members could 
freely rely on contractors to breach their national treatment obligations for them, as long as the product 
they are procuring is somehow connected to a favoured domestic product, such as a raw material or 
                                                 
78 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.109 & 7.114; and India’s response to Panel Question No. 19, 
paragraphs 2-3 referred to by USTR, supra note 20 at paras. 17-8, 28-9. 
79 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.117; and WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 17 at para. 
5.63 quoted in USTR, supra note 20 at para. 18. 
80 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.117. 
81 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.121; and USTR, supra note 20 at paras. 17-20. 
82 See USTR, Ibid at para. 20. 
83 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.114; and India’s First Written Submission, paragraph 112 
referred to by USTR, supra note 20 at para. 23. 
84 See WTO Panel Report, Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 USTR, supra note 20 at paras. 22, 28. 
87 Ibid., at para. 21. 
88 Ibid. 
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another input. This would turn Article III: 8(a) into something of a Trojan horse for the rest of Article 
III.”89 
 
Therefore, the US (and by implication, the EU) have argued that the Indian DCRs at cause 
are similar to Ontario’s DCR under the FIT Program. Both schemes required SPDs and 
renewable energy producers to source their cells and modules locally. In both cases, the 
governmental agencies were procuring electricity rather than the components such as cells 
and modules. 90  Hence, like Ontario’s failed defence of its feed-in tariff scheme, India’s 
defence of the DCRs under JNNSM must fail too. 
 
The Panel in its analysis rejected India’s dual argument under Article III: 8(a) that solar 
cells and modules cannot be treated as distinct from solar power and that by purchasing power 
generated from cells and modules, the Indian Government is actually procuring cells and 
modules.91 The Panel in its reasoning referred to the Appellate Body report in Canada—
Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff, wherein the Appellate Body termed the connection 
between generation equipment and the electricity generated therefrom as “the dispositive 
factor regarding the applicability of Article III: 8(a).”92 The Panel also rejected the argument 
put forward by India that the purchase price of electricity paid by the governmental agencies 
at the power procurement stage included the price of solar cells and modules. The Panel 
pointed out that, as the Indian DCRs require the SPDs to purchase solar cells and modules, the 
findings in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff cannot therefore be distinguished in 
any way so as to enable India to avail the derogation under Article III: 8(a).93 The Panel 
further termed the Indian DCRs as laws governing the procurement of electricity in that they 
operate to impose conditions for various processes such as bidding eligibility, participation in 
the power projects, and the use of domestically manufactured cells and modules.94 Thus, the 
implication was that the SPD can only generate electricity which will be the subject of 
government procurement if the prescribed conditions under the DCRs are met.  
  
India further argued that purchase of electricity generated by the SPDs were for the 
governmental purpose of promoting ecologically sustainable power generation. 95  This 
function, India claimed, must be viewed from the context of economic development 
challenges and the needs of its population.96 The most interesting response to this claim came 
not from the US (the complainant) but from Japan (a third party in the case). Japan argued 
that India does not need to purchase solar power in order to ensure availability of affordable 
solar power to its population or to ensure non-dependency on imported solar cells and 
modules.97 Essentially, Japan’s argument was that the Indian Government had the option to 
purchase electricity generated through solar power, and that it was entirely possible to achieve 
aims that India cited as justification without violating GATT/WTO norms. The Panel in its 
response to India’s aforementioned argument did not settle the issue. It did, however, cite the 
Appellate Body’s treatment of “government procurement” in Canada—Renewable 
Energy/Feed in Tariff, wherein the concept was defined as the purchase of goods or services 
“for the use of government, consumed by government, or provided by government to 
recipients in the discharge of its public functions.”98  
                                                 
89 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.131; and EU, supra note 6 at para. 38. 
90 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.122; and USTR, supra note 20 at para. 32. 
91 WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.128. 
92 Ibid., at para. 7.127. 
93 Ibid., at para. 7.129. 
94 Ibid., at para. 7.145. 
95 Ibid., at para. 7.153. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., at para. 7.155. 
98 Ibid., at para. 7.156. 
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The Panel also noted that the Indian Government’s aim was a composite of governmental 
purpose and public functions, whereby the Government of India was procuring electricity and 
then distributing it as part of its public function.99 To this end, India cited various arguments 
from the role of the state in countering crippling energy deficits to United Nations instruments 
that mandate the role of the state in guaranteeing access to energy.100 Furthermore, India 
claimed that governmental agencies such as SECI and NVVN do not have a commercial 
motive in the resale process, and merely act as intermediaries between the SPDs and the 
distribution companies which conduct onward sale to electricity consumers.101       
 
In addition to the above arguments, India cited additional arguments under GATT Article 
XX(d) and (j) to justify the JNNSM. GATT Article XX lays down general exceptions that are 
recognized derogations from the GATT/WTO obligations that WTO Members owe under the 
GATT/WTO framework.  
 
C. Exception under GATT Article XX (d) 
 
Exception (d) of GATT Article XX covers measures that are necessary to secure compliance 
with domestic laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with the GATT. The wording of 
exception (d) has been further elaborated on by the WTO Appellate Body in two cases: 
Korea—Various Measures on Beef 102 and Mexico—Taxes on Soft Drinks. 103  In Korea—
Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body clarified that application of Exception (d) is 
based two elements that the measure in question “must be designed to ensure compliance with 
domestic law” that are not in conflict with GATT and that the measures are necessary to 
ensure compliance thereof.104 
 
The Appellate Body further elaborated that the laws and regulations that have to be 
enforced must either form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member as legislation, 
or an international treaty or agreement that has a direct application within the domestic legal 
system of a WTO Member.105 
 
India took the argument that the DCRs at issue were essential in ensuring compliance by 
India with its obligations under domestic and international law.106 To this end, India cited 
several pieces of domestic legislation and international declarations on climate 
change/environmental policy  (namely the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), UN Conference on Enviornment and Development 1992, Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Government of India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change, the 
Electricty Act, the National Electrity Policy and the National Electricty Policy). India claimed 
that various treaties and international instruments on environmental conservation have a 
“direct” effect within India’s polity and therefore, the Government of India is bound to 
implement these treaty instruments.107 Hence, the Indian argument was that the DCRs are 
                                                 
99 Ibid., at para. 7.157. 
100 Ibid., at para. 7.161. 
101 Ibid., at para. 7.164. 
102 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 31 July 
2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R. 
103 WTO Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 6 March 2006, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS308/AB/R.  
104 WTO Appellate Body Report , supra note 102 at para. 157. 
105 WTO Appellate Body Report , supra note 103 at paras. 69, 79. 
106 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.268–76; and paragraphs 240, 255, and 260 of India’s First 
Written Submission referred to by USTR, supra note 20 at para. 51. 
107 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.294–7.  
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necessary for the Government of India to secure its own compliance. The US countered this 
argument by pointing out that India had not argued that the cited instruments were laws that 
were enforceable against persons falling within the jurisdiction of India. 108  Instead, the 
instruments cited by India were legal obligations on the Government of India itself.109 The US 
viewed Article XX(d) as:  
 
“not the vehicle for a Member to achieve compliance by its own government… As this type of self-
enforcement is the only enforcement cited by India, it has not satisfied the requirements for invoking 
Article XX (d) to justify the DCRs at issue.”110 
 
The US further argued that the laws and international obligations cited by India do not 
mention or specify the imposition of the DCRs.111 The policy documents and international 
declarations, the US argued, were so broad that these would not qualify as laws or regulations 
requiring compliance within the meaning of Article XX(d). 112  In this argument, the US 
position found support from the EU as well. The EU stated that the domestic and international 
instruments cited by India do not “point to any provisions that would require the specific 
action of imposing DCRs; neither has it identified specific provisions of the invoked laws and 
regulations that are complied with through DCRs.”113 The US and EU both cited further 
GATT and WTO reports to support their interpretation of compliance. The US cited a GATT 
era case, EEC—Parts and Components, wherein it was reasoned by the GATT Panel that 
compliance was meant “to enforce obligations” and not “to ensure the attainment of the 
objectives of laws and regulations.”114 The EU cited the panel report in Colombia—Ports of 
Entry wherein it was stated that “securing compliance” meant enforcement of obligations 
rather than ensuring attainment of the objectives of laws and regulations.115 
 
As regards the interpretation of the term “necessary”, the US cited observations by the 
Panel in US—Shrimp (Thailand) where the term “necessary” under Article XX(d) was 
interpreted as “something more than strictly making a contribution to.”116 The US took the 
position that the Indian DCR requirements only make an “indirect contribution to India’s 
compliance with its commitments” and hence cannot be considered “necessary” within the 
meaning of Article XX(d). 117  The US claimed that India has alternative policy options 
available to achieve its stated environmental goals instead of the DCRs, such as reducing or 
eliminating limitations on foreign direct investments in the solar PV sector, and secondly, 
reducing import tariffs on solar cells and modules which would serve to encourage investment 
in manufacturing solar PV technology products in India and also to reduce the overall costs of 
solar energy products.118 
 
                                                 
108 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.286; and USTR, supra note 20 at para. 50. 
109 See WTO Panel Report , supra note 1 at para. 7.304; and USTR, Ibid. 
110 USTR, Ibid., at para. 52. 
111 USTR, supra note 49 at paras. 40-1. 
112 USTR, supra note 20 at para. 54. 
113 EU, supra note 6 at para. 67; and WTO, supra note 3 at para. 7.305. 
114 GATT Panel Report, EEC—Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, 16 May 1990, GATT Doc. No. 
BISD 37S/132 [EEC—Parts and Components] at para. 5.17 cited by USTR, supra note 20 at para. 54; see also, 
USTR, supra note 49 at para. 41. 
115 WTO Panel Report, Colombia –Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, 27 April 2009, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS366/R at para. 7.538 cited by EU, supra note 6 at para. 67. 
116 WTO Panel Report, US—Measure Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, 29 February 2008, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS343/R at para. 7.188 cited by USTR, supra note 49 at para. 42. 
117 USTR, supra note 49 at para. 44. 
118 USTR, supra note 20 at paras. 73-5. 
 15 
The Panel in its analysis noted that India’s explanations failed to demonstrate any direct 
effect of international instruments cited by India.119 The Panel was of the view that India’s 
executive or legislative branch must still adopt “implementing actions” in order to implement 
India’s international obligations into the domestic legal system.120 Referring to the Appellate 
Body’s statement in Mexico—Taxes on Soft Drinks that in some legal systems of the WTO 
Members international rules may have direct effect within the domestic legal systems without 
the need for implementing legislation, the Panel held that this statement does not imply a 
distinction between the executive arm of the government taking implantation action as 
opposed to the legislative arm. 121  Rather, the Panel understood the Appellate Body’s 
observation to mean the automatic incorporation of international rules into the domestic legal 
system without any implementing instrument by any branch of the government.122 Based on 
this finding, the Panel held that India had failed to demonstrate that any of the international 
instruments cited had a "direct effect" in India, or that any of the instruments are rules for the 
purposes of its domestic legal system.123 
 
Alluding to the previous panel decisions on the occurrence of the term “rules or regulations” 
in GATT Article XX(d), the Panel stated that measures that advance the aims but do not 
enforce any obligations contained therein cannot qualify for the purpose of GATT Article 
XX(d). 124 Hence, the Panel concluded that "laws or regulations" refer to legally enforceable 
rules of conduct under the domestic legal system of the WTO Member concerned, and do not 
include general objectives.125 The Panel accepted that the Electricity Act cited by India was 
law for the purposes of its interpretation, but that all other documents such as the National 
Electricity Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the National Action Plan on Climate 
Change do not constitute legally enforceable rules of conduct. 126  The Panel’s overall 
conclusion was that the DCR measures maintained by India do not aid in securing compliance 
with laws and regulations (such as the Electricity Act) and therefore, India’s claim under 
GATT Article XX(d) failed.127  
 
D. Exception under GATT Article XX(j) 
 
Another argument taken by India in defence of its DCRs was under Exception (j) of GATT 
Article XX. The relevant parts of Exception (j) provides for countries to adopte measures 
that are “Essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
supply.”  
 
Broken down to its very basics, this Exception allows countries to adopt measures to 
alleviate a short supply of essential materials. Whether or not this Exception applied in the 
present case turned upon the interpretation of the phrases “essential” and “short supply.” 
  
India took the argument that the market share of domestically-manufactured solar cells and 
modules was low. Hence, government intervention is needed to reduce dependency on foreign 
cells and modules. 128 India referred to the post-World War II roots of Article XX(j) and 
                                                 
119 WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.298. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., at para. 7.299.  
122 Ibid., at para. 7.299–300. 
123 Ibid., at para. 7.301. 
124 Ibid., at paras. 7.310, 7.330–32.  
125 Ibid., at paras. 7.311. 
126 Ibid., at paras. 7.318 & 7.322. 
127 Ibid., at paras. 7.332–3. 
128 Ibid., at para. 7.189; see also, India’s first written submission at para. 209 referred to by EU, supra note 6 at 
para. 47.  
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acknowledged that the provision was meant to be applicable in exceptional circumstances 
only. However, the provision should be interpreted according to evolved circumstances.129 
The crux of the Indian argument was that the expression “short supply” used within Article 
XX(j) was of a broad nature and it should be contextualized within the objectives of 
sustainable development, energy security, and environmental protection.130 India further took 
the argument that Article XX(j) not only deals with measures that are “essential” for acquiring 
products in short supply, but can also include measures that are “necessary” for addressing the 
“short supply” of products in question.131  
 
In response to the Indian arguments, the US cited the Appellate Body in China—Raw 
Materials, which interpreted the expression “general or local short supply” as where a product 
is “available only in limited quantity” or “scarce”.132 The US stated that this expression can 
mean both a shortage of supply in the international market without being in short supply 
locally, or a product that is readily available internationally but is in short supply locally 
within a country.133 The US used these alternative meanings and attacked India’s arguments 
on both counts (i.e. India has failed to demonstrate whether solar cells or modules are in short 
supply internationally or locally). 134  The US queried India’s motive in light of India’s 
admission that solar cells and modules are “adequately available” in the international market 
and yet India has not availed themselves of the opportunity of importing the products in “short 
supply” through imports.135 The EU, in its third party submission, also agreed with the US 
and stated that:  
 
“[if] the products that are allegedly in short supply are solar cells and modules, it is… unclear how 
measures leading to restricting their importation could possibly alleviate the alleged shortage in supply, 
whether general or local. If anything, it will have the opposite effect.”136  
 
Regarding the question of essentiality in Article XX(j), the US again referred to the 
Appellate Body’s interpretation in China—Raw Materials. The Appellate Body had 
interpreted “essential” in that case as meaning “absolutely indispensable or necessary”.137 The 
US was of the view that, where a WTO Member is able to acquire and distribute the product 
in question, “it is difficult to envisage how a WTO-inconsistent measure to decrease 
availability of that product domestically could be ‘essential’ to the ‘acquisition’ or 
‘distribution’ of that product.” 138  The US observed that DCRs that discriminate against 
imports would increase difficulties in the acquisition or distribution of a product in short 
supply by limiting the sources of “supply”. Hence, adopting such measures would be 
“antithetical” to the aims of Article XX(j).139 The US suggested stockpiling of solar cells and 
modules by India and elimination of DCRs as GATT-consistent alternatives to forestalling 
                                                 
129 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.231; see also, India’s first written submission at paras. 209-12 
referred to by EU, supra note 6 at para. 47. 
130 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.231; see also India’s first written submission at paras. 221-2 
referred to by EU, supra note 6 at para. 48. 
131 See WTO Panel Report , supra note 1 at para. 7.239; see also India’s second written submission at  paragraph 
62 referred to by USTR, supra note 49 at para. 34. 
132 WTO Appellate Body Report, China—Measures related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 30 
January 2012, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS395/AB/R [China—Raw Materials] at para. 325 cited by USTR, supra 
note 20 at para. 36; see also, WTO, supra note 2 at paras. 7.203–4. 
133 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at para. 7.221; see also, USTR, supra note 20 at para. 36. 
134 Ibid. 
135 See reference to India’s First Written Submission at paras. 233 and 236 referred to by USTR, supra note 20 at 
para. 37. 
136 EU, supra note 6 at para. 51. 
137 WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 132 at para. 326 cited by USTR, supra note 20 at para. 38. 
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any “short supply”.140 The US rounded off its argument on the Indian use of Article XX(j) by 
noting that Article XX(j) does not “sanction the use of WTO-inconsistent measures” to 
achieve government policy objectives when governments can easily acquire the products in 
question through alternative means.141 
 
The Panel found that India failed in demonstrating the DCRs are justified under GATT 
Article XX(j).142 In reaching this conclusion, the Panel interpreted the expression “products in 
general or local short supply” to mean a scenario where quantity of available supply of a 
particular product does not meet the demand in a geographical area.143 The Panel stated that 
adopting India’s interpretation of the expression “products in general or local short supply” 
would mean “products in general or local short production” and while the Panel agreed with 
India’s argument that supply and production may be intrinsically linked, these two words are 
not interchangeable.144 The Panel also responded to India’s alternative argument that lack of 
domestic manufacturing capacity establishes that a product is in short supply.145 The Panel 
said that India has neither pointed out to what constitutes lack of domestic manufacturing 
capacity, nor indicated what constitutes “sufficient” manufacturing capacity.146 
 
Additionally, the Panel held that the term “products in general or local short supply” do not 
extend to products that are at risk of becoming in short supply.147 The Panel further explained 
that, if the concept of risk was to be included in the interpretation of “products in general or 
local short supply”, then only “imminent” risks of such shortage should be permissible.148 The 
Panel in its analysis referred to the Appellate Body’s interpretation in China—Raw Materials 
where the words “to prevent… critical shortages” in GATT Article XI: 2(a) were interpreted 
to include measures adopted to alleviate or reduce an existing critical shortage, as well as 
preventive or anticipatory measures adopted to pre-empt an imminent critical shortage.149 The 
word “imminent” was interpreted as something “soon to happen” by the Panel.150 On this 
point, the Panel noted out that India had not informed of any impending shortage of solar cells 
and modules in the world market prior to the dispute.151  
 
Hence, the Panel found that that the risk of solar cells and modules becoming in short 
supply in India does not amount to solar cells and modules being "products in general or local 
short supply" within the meaning of Article XX(j).152 The next part of the article analyses the 
dispute and its effects on development of renewable energy sector in light of the Panel’s 
decision. 
 
III. ANALYSIS  
 
The arguments made by the US and India should not be considered in isolation. The 
arguments themselves are a manifestation of deeper issues with the entire system of 
                                                 
140 USTR, supra note 49 at para. 35. 
141 Ibid., at para. 37; and USTR, supra note 20 at para. 43. 
142 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 1 at paras. 7.264–5. 
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144 Ibid., at paras. 7.224. 
145 Ibid., at paras. 7.226. 
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148 Ibid., at paras. 7.255–57. 
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151 Ibid., at para. 7.262. 
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government support to fledgling industries. Successive Indian governments have consistently 
maintained a strong focus on foreign investment and enhancement of domestic industrial 
capacity. The JNNSM is an indicator that Indian governments wish to not only promote 
renewable energy projects to meet domestic demand for electricity, but also wish to marry this 
particular aim with the objective of enhancing domestic manufacturing of solar cells, modules, 
and other apparatus for use in Solar PV technology. Hence, we have the Indian Government 
expressing its intent to appeal the decision of the panel. 
 
This article was written immediately after the announcement of the panel’s decision in 
India—Solar Cells. With the availability of the text of the decision, we can see that the 
decision is close in letter and spirit to the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff case, at 
least where the extent of Article III: 8 derogation is concerned. The panel is obviously in a 
better position to rule on the merits of the arguments taken by the parties. However, with the 
benefit of hindsight, we take this opportunity to discuss the deeper issue of the trade interests 
of developing countries versus those of developed countries. 
 
Whenever a trade dispute involving the environment, renewable energy products, or even 
environmental conservation policies of WTO Members becomes the subject of a WTO 
dispute settlement proceeding, we see commentators and analysts speculating on the legal 
rights of the disputants and interpretations of the parties. However, when we look carefully at 
the source of the problem, we can easily see that there is not enough specificity in the WTO 
law of subsidies, namely, that even though statutory language is framed prohibitively, it 
realistically allows nothing. The question, then, is how developing countries can pursue 
policies that are WTO-compliant and environmental-friendly. It is clear that existing WTO 
rules, in their present state, are unsuited for the attainment of this goal. 
 
The US has conveniently taken the argument that it does not oppose India’s efforts to 
pursue environmental aims through renewable energy projects. In fact, it claims that the 
Indian DCRs are actually counterproductive, as they restrict market access and result in the 
impediment of Indian measures to install solar PV projects. However, what the US ignores (or 
chooses not to accept) is the fact that the Indian measures are not just about environmental 
aims; they are about domestic industrial advancement, creation of jobs, and economic activity 
as well. These are aims that a heavily-populated, developing country with a significant 
population living below the poverty line like India simply cannot ignore. Viewed from this 
perspective, the DCR measures serve a dual purpose: economic progress and environmental 
protection through sustainable energy generation.  
 
The obvious aim of the DCRs is to create domestic providers of solar PV products in the 
Indian market. This has clear benefits for the Indian economy, the foremost being that fully-
developed solar PV industries would be able to compete with international suppliers, 
providing flow-on benefits for solar PV technology users due to induced price- and quality-
based competition. This competition can also spur technology innovation and even 
technology collaboration, which is a win-win scenario for any developing country facing 
environmental challenges.  
 
Unfortunately, the GATT/WTO framework does not look kindly at incentivization policies 
such as DCRs. Ha-Joon Chang, for example, highlights the particular example of the ASCM 
and the TRIMS Agreement as effectively outlawing many policies and measures that several 
developed countries themselves adopted in their industrial advancement. 153  Even more 
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unfortunate is the fact that, while we can indulge in academic debate on the merits and 
demerits of the WTO multilateral trading system, these problems cannot simply be resolved 
through democratic dispensation in the form of a legislative proposal to reform the WTO 
system. Meanwhile, India—Solar Cells and its predecessor Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed 
in Tariff will certainly not be the last cases involving a clash of environmental, trade, and 
domestic policy concerns. When looked at from the lens of Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed 
in Tariff, India has no doubt breached WTO law. But India, as a highly-populated developing 
country with a growing need for energy security, must be understood from its own perspective. 
India explained its perspective in the initial stages of the dispute settlement process by using 
words such as “energy security, ensuring ecologically sustainable growth, and ensuring 
sustainable development.” The Panel claimed that it will assess the WTO-consistency of such 
measures while taking into account the policy rationale presented by India if they are legally 
relevant.154 However, results of the decisions in the aforementioned cases show little doubt 
that the WTO rules, as framed, cannot allow several types of support measures that can 
potentially be used to develop renewable energy industries.  
 
Environmental groups and some industry groups will accuse the WTO of having an anti-
environment bias. Such groups will point to earlier cases such as China—Rare Earths, 
China—Raw Materials, US—Shrimp and US—Gasoline in order to bolster their arguments. 
The challenge of balancing trade interests with other, often conflicting, aims of environmental 
conservation and domestic industrial capacity building will very likely lead to further trading 
disputes between WTO Members. The decisions highlighted above show that the results of 
these decisions would almost always be decided in advance. This underscores the need for 
change in the existing WTO approach. However, the WTO dispute settlement is itself 
constrained by the various agreements under the GATT/WTO framework. Aaron Cosbey 
aptly terms the WTO as “absolutely the wrong place to address issues of law where there is no 
international consensus on what the law should say.”155 
 
If incentivisation is the only way a developing country can foster growth in an area it 
wishes to develop, then this will surely give rise to more cases where the conflict between the 
TRIMS Agreement and GATT Article III: 4 is the central subject. The problem is, however, 
even amongst the WTO Members themselves there is no clear agreement on how to determine 
violations of the TRIMS and GATT Article III: 4. This is illustrated through the divergence of 
views that emerged during the Panel proceedings. Brazil, for example, advocated an approach 
which grants primacy to GATT over the TRIMS Agreement. According to Brazil, claims 
similar to India—Solar Cells and Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff must be 
resolved by fully examining the claims under GATT 1994 before considering TRIMS.156 The 
EU, on the other hand, considers the TRIMS Illustrative List along with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 
of the TRIMS Agreement to be more specific in nature, enableing simplified decision-making 
instead of the open-ended assessments under GATT Article III.157 Japan and Canada disagree 
with the notion of specificity forwarded by the EU. Canada viewed TRIMS-specific nature 
limited only to the trade-related investment measures, while Japan favours an approach based 
on conduct of the past Panels that have dealt with TRIMS and GATT Article III: 4 together in 
disputes.158 The Panel, in its response, highlighted that past panels have reached different 
conclusions on the matter and that, in India—Solar Cells, the central issue is not about which 
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agreement is more specific or which one of the instruments should be considered first. Rather, 
it is about whether the DCR measure become inconsistent with GATT Article III: 4 if it fell 
within Paragraph 1(a) of the TRIMS Illustrative List.159 While the Panel offered its own view 
on the sequence of application (favouring the start of the analysis through Article 2.2 of the 
TRIMS), there is no guarantee that this analysis by the Panel provides a cogent and a 
workable template for a developing country to construct an incentivisation regime that is 
WTO-compliant. This is because the next panel confronted with a similar dispute might not 
follow the Panel in India—Solar Cells case. Considering India—Solar Cells and Canada—
Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff and then comparing them with the earlier cases that debated 
the TRIMS Agreement’s specific relationship with GATT Article III: 4 reveals ambiguity and 
vagueness that only makes rules in this area of WTO law more archaic (see Table 1 below).  
 
Table 1 - Comparison of Cases Dealing With GATT Article III: 4 and the TRIMs 
Case Paragraph 
Reference 
Panel’s Decision 
Indonesia—Autos Para 14.63 TRIMs Agreement was deemed to be “more 
specific” than the GATT 1994. Hence the TRIMs 
claims was examined first. 
 
Canada—Autos Para 10.63 Panel expressed doubt on whether TRIMs 
Agreement is more specific than the relevant GATT 
1994 provisions. Analysis should be started on the 
basis of GATT.  
 
India—Autos Para 7.157 Same as above. 
 
Canada—Renewable 
Energy/Feed in Tariff 
Para 7.70 Since the TRIMs Agreement deals directly and 
specifically in detail with the challenged aspects of 
the measures at issue, therefore, the analysis should 
begin from TRIMs  
 
 
The effect of the lack of clarity in the area (compounded by the artificiality of the case-by-
case approach) means that in the forseeable future, WTO Members (particularly developing 
countries) attempting to develop domestic industrial capacity will run into conflict with their 
WTO commitments. In other words, if developing countries comply with WTO commitments, 
any policy incentivising use of local production and are doomed from the start. Here, the 
observation that government intervention (e.g. subsidies) for renewable energy is a necessity 
in practically all countries seeking to promote renewable energy becomes particularly 
relevant.160 We must bear in mind that government intervention in developing new sectors of 
the economy is not just subsidy-based, but also spans a much wider spectrum of activities. 
Feed-in tariffs or guaranteed long term rates of power purchase are a time-tested method in 
attracting development and investment in the power generation sector. Therefore, the 
understanding of the term “government intervention: should not be limited to DCRs, but must 
also encompass measures like feed-in tariffs without which no renewable energy project will 
ever take off the ground. 
 
Critics of such an approach conveniently ignore the historical development trajectory taken 
by developed countries. Such critics may also claim that, regardless of the outcome of the 
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dispute between India and the US on solar subsidies, the result will be increased use of 
renewable energy. Therefore, they claim that the argument that this decision impedes 
penetration of renewable energy is invalid. In response to this critique, we must adopt a 
broader approach to the issue of subsidies and incentives. If we look behind the triggers and 
motivators behind the dispute, the deeper issue is revealed. Whether or not the use of 
renewable energy will increase regardless of the outcome is not the real issue. Rather, the real 
issue is whose renewable energy products will be used. The US is trying to protect its industry 
interests by citing WTO law, while India is trying to promote the use of its domestically-
manufactured renewable energy products and to create jobs in the economy. Furthermore, we 
must also consider the fact that subsidies for renewable energy projects on the basis of import 
only will not interest a highly-populated developing country like India. In order to enhance 
penetration of renewable energy products, governments encourage the establishment of 
domestic manufacturing simultaneously with renewable energy projects with several aims in 
mind, such as job creation, promoting environmentally-friendly power generation, and 
reduced foreign exchange spending on imports. China had earlier followed a similar strategy 
in the wind power sector. This is evident from the fact that China not only managed to 
increase its installed wind capacity from 2599 Megawatts in 2006 to 44,733 Megawatts in 
2010, but also simultaneously developed domestic manufacturing capacity in the sector as 
well. In 2004, 82% of all wind power generation equipment installed in China was of foreign 
origin. This subsequently transitioned to 90% domestically-manufactured equipment used for 
all new wind power projects by 2010.161 According to latest data available from the World 
Wind Energy Association, China added 33 Gigawatts of new capacity in the wind energy 
sector in 2015, representing an overall market share of 51.8%.162 China accomplished this 
growth on the back of subsidies, incentives, and the inward diversion of critical inputs, 
allowing Chinese industries to meet domestic demand while developing an export-oriented 
strategy in the wind power sector.  
 
Along the way, we see that the US kept on challenging China’s support measures in the 
WTO (most notable amongst these challenges are the China—Rare Earths, China—Raw 
Materials, China—Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment cases). In all of the cases 
mentioned here, China “lost” and had to roll back its programmes. However, by the time the 
disputes were resolved through the WTO dispute settlement system, the incentives generated 
through inward diversion of resources and/or incentivisation had already done the trick for 
China. 163  The net result is that Chinese wind turbine industries are now globally- and 
nationally-competitive. In addition to allowing China to conserve foreign exchange, these 
competitive industries allow China to engage an abundance of its labour resources. The 
cheaper price of domestically-manufactured components enable greater penetration of 
renewable energy products than what would be possible under the direct import model. This is 
clearly evident from the example of China’s experience with its wind energy sector and from 
China’s increased solar panel manufacturing (in 2015, China’s solar capacity was 43.2 
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Gigawatts. This is projected to reach 140 Gigawatts by 2020).164 Furthermore, according to 
one estimate, the corresponding power cost generated by China’s solar power projects will 
fall by 38% by year 2020, leading to lowered costs and increased affordability of solar power 
projects. 165  These compelling facts show that there is a strong nexus between domestic 
manufacturing and achievement of higher penetration of renewable energy generation which 
enables realization of environmental protection goals. Any developing country that is facing 
environmental challenges and therefore, desires pursuit of power generation through 
renewable energy cannot do so simply on the basis of imports (as the US, EU, and Japan are 
claiming in India—Solar Cells). Such a country must develop a domestic sector that can 
compete with imports leading to reduced prices of solar cells and modules instead.  
 
IV. “REVERSE PERMISSIBILITY” 
 
With the analysis of the preceding Part IV of the article, it is manifestly evident that the US is 
challenging the Indian DCRs because they incentivise purchasing of locally-manufactured 
solar panels and modules. WTO law is fast becoming more of an obstacle to development and 
the trade in environmentally-friendly technologies. It appears that the only way out for 
“defiant” developing countries, such as China and India, is firstly to adopt WTO-inconsistent 
policies (which any astutue reader of history of global trade knows is the route adopted by 
developed countries themselves in the their path to industrialization and economic 
development) and secondly, to discontinue these policies if challenged in the WTO.  
 
Obviously the current state of affairs cannot continue for long. For one, it challenges the 
integrity of the WTO system; and secondly, it is becoming more and more a form of 
organised thuggery by the developed countries against many developing countries that wish to 
lay foundations of competing industrial sectors. Although reform is inevitable, the question 
which confronts the environmental groups, industry stakeholders, and WTO Members is the 
form which it will take. Cosbey cites Dani Rodrik’s argument that incentivization should be 
permissible if the proposed activities are classified as “new”. 166 Cosbey also summarizes 
Rodrik’s arguments that if the aim of the incentivization programme is to support activities 
that lead to economic growth, then it becomes important to distinguish between state support 
for existing sectors, those that are “genuinely new”, and those which face several barriers to 
new activities.167 Additionally, the support extended to the new sectors must be subject to a 
sunset clause.168 While these proposals certainly sound good on paper, executing them is an 
entirely different game altogether. 
 
We know for a fact that the WTO system is based on years of extended multilateral trade 
negotiations that resulted in the Marrakesh Agreement. We also know that until these 
underlying multilateral agreements are amended and changed, the dispute settlement system 
will keep churning out decisions like the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed-in Tariff and 
India—Solar Cells cases simply because the dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body 
are constrained to rule according to the agreements concluded by the WTO Members. While 
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the Doha Round remains indefinitely bogged down and with negotiators reluctant to take on 
any additional agenda items, the chances for amendment of the multilateral agreements falling 
within the aegis of the Marrakesh Agreement appear slim. 
 
An alternative approach that may be possible, given the constraints of the Doha Round and 
the ticking time bomb of climate change, is to incorporate an agreed departure from the 
GATT/WTO norms limited to environmental protection. Within the context of subsidies and 
support measures, this can be termed as the “Reverse Permissibility” approach. Under this 
approach, instead of using open and abstract language which essentially prohibit all types of 
state subsidies, WTO Members can adopt a “reverse” stance by concluding an agreed 
departure. The agreed departure identifies a narrow range of measures that are expressly 
permissible. These permissible measures can, for example, be limited to development of new 
sectors in an economy that can help achieve environmental conservation aims. Furthermore, 
in order to execute plans for the development of new sectors, DCRs could be made 
permissible while measures such as quantitative restrictions can remain prohibited. Clearly 
specifying permissible subsidy measures will not only minimize the need of WTO Members 
to resort to the dispute settlement mechanism, but also enable developing countries, in 
particular, to draft policies around the core of permissible subsidy measures. Such an 
approach automatically cures the timing argument between GATT Article III: 4 and 
provisions of the TRIMS Agreeement.169 Reverse Permissibility in environment-related state 
support measures will also enhance transparency in an otherwise ambiguous area of 
GATT/WTO Framework. This means that the WTO Members clearly know which measures 
are permissible and which measures are not.  
 
The next step involves special and differential treatment combined with a limited time 
grant to countries desiring the establishment of new domestic renewable energy sectors. At 
the end of the specified period, these countries would be required to undertake measures to 
gradually liberalize their economies and allow open competition within them. This can be 
done through a mandatory sunset clause. The resulting competition would allow for a much 
more open playing field for both domestic and foreign suppliers. The end result, from an 
environmental perspective, would be the lowering of costs (a result that is demonstrated 
through projected tariff reduction in China of solar power by year 2020) and increased market 
penetration of renewable energy technologies within the developing country markets. The 
major obstacle to adopting such a course of action will come from developed countries, whose 
vested trade interests have prompted actors such as the EU, Japan, and the US to challenge 
any measures that may pose a competitive threat. The ASCM and the TRIMS Agreement are 
couched in terms that allow little room for manoeuvering as far as developing countries are 
concerned. Therefore, any efforts to negotiate an agreed departure from GATT/WTO norms 
in order to accommodate the environmental objectives within the WTO framework must also 
take into account the impact of the ASCM and the TRIMS Agreement.  
 
In constructing the reverse permissibility model, we must also consider an interesting 
argument that may flow from the reasoning in the Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff 
and India—Solar Cells cases. This argument flows from the scenario where the government 
of a WTO Member procures domestically-produced solar cells and modules as part of a 
government procurement plan so that Article III: 8(a) derogation may be availed. The 
procured cells and modules can then be supplied to SPDs with the precondition that they be 
used in order to avail feed-in tariffs and other incentives. This may provide a way out for 
developing countries in a similar position to India. However, it will not at all be surprising if 
this “way out” is barred by a WTO dispute settlement process as well.  
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Problems also stem from conflicting understandings of what “governmental purpose” or 
“public function” amounts to when determining government procurement. The Panel in 
India—Solar Cells noted the treatment of the issue in Canada—Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariff, where the Appellate Body was of the view that that the phrase "products purchased for 
governmental purposes" in Article III:8(a) "refers to what is consumed by the government or 
what is provided by government to recipients in the discharge of its public functions", with 
the scope of such functions determined on a case-by-case basis.170 The Appellate Body also 
noted that there must be a rational relationship between the purchased product and the 
governmental function being discharged.171 This means that it becomes essential for the term 
“governmental function” to be interpreted because it provides the causal link between what is 
and is not permissible under GATT Article III: 4 and TRIMS. Unfortunately, the GATT/WTO 
Framework is silent on this term. Furthermore, the artificiality of the case-by-case approach in 
dispute settlement means that, even if the Panel or Appellate Body affixes a meaning to the 
term in question, there is no guarantee that the same meaning will be fully applicable in the 
next dispute involving GATT Article III: 4, III: 8, and TRIMS. A quick perusal of Paragraphs 
7.157—7.162 of the India—Solar Cells Panel report demonstrates a conflict between the 
disputants’ respective understanding on what is meant by governmental function and how that 
fits in with government procurement.  
 
Thus, if a country follows a particular governance system which may combine several 
governmental purposes and public functions, will the WTO law bypass those governmental 
functions? There is no clear answer to this question. However, what is abundantly clear from 
decisions such as India—Solar Cells is that no developing country can develop a competing 
sector in renewable energy without state support; which, unfortunately, by the decision in 
India—Solar Cells has been declared illegal under the WTO. It is exactly this shortcoming 
that is cured by adopting a “reverse permissibility” approach which aims to adopt a more 
specific approach to the issue of state support. Under the suggested approach, if a developing 
country wishes to establish a “new” sector of development which contributes to goals such as 
environmental conservation and sustainable power generation through renewable energy, then 
it should be permissible for states to extend support. Furthermore, the suggested approach 
specifies clear meanings for terms such as governmental purposes and public functions. Doing 
so may serve to plug the gaps left by the GATT/WTO Framework, which often causes 
confusion for policymakers and government officials when constructing WTO-compliant 
policies. The execution of reverse permissibility can be done through a multilateral approach 
similar to the GATT Enabling Clause that allowed preferential treatment to be extended for 
developing countries by avoiding the GATT MFN obligations. The first possible step could 
be consolidation of all relevant GATT/WTO decisions into a separate agreement followed by 
the second step that takes the form of an agreed departure. This is a difficult proposition 
because negotiating an agreed departure may run into roadblocks, given that the industrial 
interests of several developed countries militate against giving any incubation room for 
competing industries to develop in the developing countries. However, this solution is clearly 
necessitated because WTO law as it stands currently promotes a pure import model as 
opposed to domestic capacity building, which developing countries seem to be interested in 
for promoting greater penetration of renewable energy technologies in their power sectors.  
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